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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey period saw further developments and exposed some
new and interesting questions in the law of trade secrets, tortious
interference, false advertising, and other business torts. It also saw
further interpretations of some of the new statutes regulating fair and
unfair behavior, especially regarding the use of new technologies. In par-
ticular, the Texas law of noncompetition covenants continued its trend
toward stricter interpretation and enforcement.
II. NONCOMPETITION COVENANTS
A. STOCK OPTIONS AND THE VANISHING "GIVE RISE" REQUIREMENT
The most significant case in this Survey period, Marsh USA Inc. v.
Cook, is the latest in a decades-long series of Texas Supreme Court cases
construing Subchapter E of the Texas Business and Commerce Code and
the covenants against competition to which Subchapter E applies.1
The plaintiff, Mr. Cook, was a managing director of Marsh USA Inc.
(Marsh), a large insurance brokerage firm for which he had worked since
1983. He was included in the 1992 Employee Incentive and Stock Award
Plan and was granted stock options in 1996. Before exercising them,
however, he had to sign a non-solicitation agreement which contained a
covenant not to compete. Mr. Cook signed the agreement in 2005 and
exercised the stock options, but he left Marsh in 2007 and went to work
for one of its competitors. When Marsh sued to enforce the noncompeti-
tion covenant, Mr. Cook claimed it was unenforceable because it was
signed in return for stock options, and stock options in and of themselves
did not "give rise" to the need for a noncompetition covenant from him.
In Texas, noncompetition covenants are governed by sections 15.50-.52
of the Texas Business & Commerce Code. The principal requirement is
found in section 15.50(a), which provides in part that:
A covenant not to compete is enforceable if it is ancillary to or part
of an otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is
made to the extent that it contains limitations as to time, geographi-
cal area, and scope of activity to be restrained that are reasonable
1. Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. 2011). Subchapter E, titled "Cove-
nants Not to Compete," is codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 15.50-.52.
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and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the
goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.
2
The terms "ancillary to or part of," "an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment," and "at the time the agreement is made" have all been heavily
disputed and litigated. 3 Until Marsh, it was generally understood that the
phrase "ancillary to or part of," considered in light of the consideration
the promisor was to receive in return for the noncompetition covenant,
meant that the promisee needed to extend consideration of a type and
quality that would only be (or best be) protected by the promisor staying
out of the field in a given area altogether for a period of time-in other
words, that the type of consideration being given by the employer would
"give rise" to the need for a noncompetition covenant. 4 A corollary of
this principle was that the noncompetition covenant should be designed
to enforce that promise.5
Entrustment with trade secrets, specialized training, introductions and
exposure to a company's customers and goodwill, and similar intangible
benefits have been examples of consideration which might be considered
to "give rise" to an employer's need for a noncompetition covenant.
Each of these is intangible and not very fungible, and their value and
consequent damages could be hard to quantify if they were misused.
Thus, covenants in which employees promise, in effect, to stay out of
temptation's reach altogether for awhile could be seen as necessary and
appropriate ways to protect them-in a way that giving those employees
a fistful of extra cash, for instance, could not. Giving an employee an
extra amount of cash, for no other reason than to keep that employee
from competing with his or her employer, seems closer to a naked re-
straint of trade as prohibited under Texas Business & Commercial Code
section 15.05.
Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook involved neither extreme, but something in
the middle: stock options, which are not themselves intangible trade
secrets and the like, but are not simply cash either.6 Mr. Cook urged that
they were much closer to simply cash, and, hence, his former employer's
tender of them did not "give rise" to a legitimate need for a noncompeti-
tion covenant in return. The supreme court disagreed, reasoning-if not
altogether persuasively-that stock options are more than simply cash
because they are closely tied to an employer's goodwill.
7
The supreme court might have stopped at that relatively narrow hold-
ing and let it go at that, but the supreme court continued, concluding that
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) (West 2011).
3. See, e.g., Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844,
848-49 (Tex. 2009) (construing "at the time the agreement is made"); Alex Sheshunoff
Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 648-55 (Tex. 2006) (construing "an other-
wise enforceable agreement").
4. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d at 648-49.
5. Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex.. 883 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. 1994).
6. Marsh, 354 S.W.3d at 766.
7. Id. at 777-78.
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the statute does not actually impose a "give rise" requirement after all.8
Certainly the words "give rise" do not appear in the statute, and, apply-
ing basic principles of statutory construction that make a statute's words
the first place to look in determining legislative intent, the supreme court
found no indication the legislature intended to include a "give rise" re-
quirement and disavowed any on its own.9
To a great extent, this holding reflects a considerable shift over the
years, less of the legislature than of the Texas Supreme Court. From the
mid- to late-1980s the Texas Supreme Court seemed overtly hostile to
noncompetition covenants, while the legislature enacted and revised the
statute specifically to override some of the court's rulings. By the mid-
1990s, however, the supreme court seemed to be searching for a complex
middle ground that was respectful of the statute yet demanding of non-
competition covenant promises. In the 2000s, the supreme court gener-
ally seems at least to support the idea of noncompetition covenants in
principle, in some ways coming full circle back to the Weatherford deci-
sion of 1960 which established in Texas the reasonableness standard as to
time, scope, and geographic area. 10 This acceptance of noncompetition
covenants represents a significant policy choice on the part of the Texas
legislature, and one not shared by legislatures as disparate as those of
California and Alabama-both of which disavow postemployment non-
competition covenants altogether, except in limited circumstances."
For now, we may expect to see a rise in stock-option grants in hopes of
furthering the enforceability of post-employment noncompetition cove-
nants, though that may be tempered by the astute businessperson's
awareness that stock is easy to grant and hard to get back. In the absence
of a "give rise" requirement, the phrase "ancillary to or part of" is also
likely to need further examination. It is likely, too, that the noncompeti-
tion battleground may now shift from argument over statutory construc-
tion to fact-based disputes over what is a reasonable and fair balance in
particular cases. More deeply, however, the fact that states as culturally
different from each other as California and Alabama agree on and share,
as a matter of fundamental public policy, a strong distaste for postem-
ployment noncompetition covenants suggests that instead of being "baf-
fled" by "reluctance to enforce [them]," Texas courts might find there is
something to learn.
B. GROOMING CASES: PART I
The Dallas Court of Appeals case of Jon Scott Salon, Inc. v. Garcia
reminds us that employees who have at-will status can still be subject to
noncompete and non-solicitation agreements. 12 Appellees Garcia and
8. Id. at 773-76.
9. Id. at 778-79.
10. See generally, Weatherford Oil Tool Co. v. Campbell, 340 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1960).
11. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2011).
12. Jon Scott Salon, Inc. v. Garcia, 343 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
[Vol. 65
Business Torts
Gresham were cosmetologists at the Jon Scott salon. 13 They both signed
employment agreements that included nondisclosure agreements and
nonsolicitation covenants whereby they agreed that they would not di-
rectly or indirectly market their services to the salon's customers within a
ten-mile radius for one year after termination of their employment.
14
They also acknowledged in writing that the salon would provide them
with opportunities and resources to develop contacts and goodwill, and,
in turn, they would refrain from benefiting from using that goodwill for
the benefit of any person or entity other than the salon. The salon then
provided them with training manuals, marketing programs, and customer
information. Garcia and Gresham resigned from the salon in April 2010
and immediately opened their own salon within the prohibited ten-mile
radius.15 The salon alleged that it began to experience large amounts of
no-show appointments and cancellations from clients with whom Garcia
and Gresham had worked.
The salon filed suit for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade
secrets, theft, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty.16 The trial court
granted a temporary restraining order, but, at the temporary injunction
hearing that followed, the court interrupted witness testimony and denied
the salon's request for an injunction as a matter of law. 17 The court de-
termined that the covenants at issue in the contract were not enforceable
because the contracts were for "at-will" employment and, therefore, the
covenant was not ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment as required by the Covenants Not to Compete Act of section
15.50(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the "Act").' 8
The salon filed an interlocutory appeal claiming the trial court misap-
plied the law. 19 The appeals court agreed. Citing the Texas Supreme
Court case Sheshunoff Management Services, L.P. v. Johnson, the court
reasoned that the Act did not require the non-compete or non-solicita-
tion agreement to be enforceable at the time the agreement is made. 20
The agreement becomes enforceable based on performance. Once the
employer fulfills the promise to provide confidential information, the
contract can support the restrictive covenants. 21 The fact that they are
contained in an at-will employment agreement does not, as a matter of
law, make them unenforceable. The case was then remanded to the trial
court for further consideration. 22
As a matter of historical interest, noncompete historians will recall that
barbering was among the "common callings" of which the Texas Supreme




17. Id. at 533-34.
18. Id. at 534.
19. Id.





Court refused to enforce noncompetition covenants in the 1980s follow-
ing the Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc. decision, which announced the
"common calling" doctrine. 23
C. GROOMING CASES: PART II
Times change, and "grooming" is evidently now a subject of hard dis-
pute. In another case involving the grooming industry-this time for
dogs-the Waco Court of Appeals continued the 2011 trend of expanding
the enforceability of non-competition covenants. In Salas v. Chris Chris-
tensen Systems, Inc., Christensen was in the business of manufacturing
and distributing "high quality dog grooming products. '24 Christensen
hired Salas, a dog handler and groomer, to be its vice president of sales.
Salas signed a noncompete and confidentiality agreement with his new
employer. Christensen provided Salas with training about what it re-
garded as its unique system, and about other trade secrets, including cus-
tomer and distributor lists and ingredients and manufacturing methods
for its products.25 According to the agreement, Salas agreed that, for a
period of five years, he would refrain from "endeavor[ing] to entice away
from [Christensen] any client or account, with whom [Salas] had direct
contact... [for any] entity, whatsoever, which is or intends to be engaged
in providing or manufacturing pet supplies and related products. ' 26 The
agreement did not contain an express geographic limitation.
After a little more than a year, Salas resigned from the company and
contacted Christensen's main competitor to hire him.27 He began pro-
moting the competitor's products using Christensen's confidential infor-
mation and induced two of Christensen's principal distributors to drop
Christensen's products in favor of the competitor's. Christensen filed suit
against Salas, alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade
secrets, and tortious interference. 28
On a restricted appeal, Salas argued that the lack of geographic limita-
tion made the non-competition covenant unenforceable. 29 The appeals
court rejected Salas' argument. The court held that while a covenant not
to compete with a broad or no geographic scope is unenforceable, the
covenant may nonetheless be enforceable if it contains a substitute re-
striction-for example, limiting the agreement to a particular client
base.30 The court held that Salas's agreement was limited to "entities
which are or intend to be 'engaged in providing and manufacturing pet
23. Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 172 (Tex. 1987). See Bergman v.
Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. 1987) (barbering a "commission calling").
24. Salas v. Chris Christensen Sys., Inc., No. 10-11-00107-CV, 2011 WL 4089999, at *1
(Tex. App.-Waco Sept. 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *2.
28. Id.




supplies and related products manufactured and distributed by [Christen-
sen],"' and that restriction was an acceptable substitute for a geographic
limitation. The court went on to reason that, even if the lack of geo-
graphic limitation caused the agreement to be problematic, Salas had ob-
tained trade secrets and confidential information from Christensen that
were used to induce customers to discontinue business with Christensen.
Even without a non-competition agreement, Salas was still restricted
from using that information to compete with Christensen. 3 1
Interestingly, the court did not address whether a five-year restriction
would be unreasonably long.
III. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
A. LoOSE Lips SINK CASES
Downing v. Burns32 is a reminder of two important lessons to an em-
ployer: (1) take appropriate measures to protect confidential information
or risk losing trade secret protection and (2) be careful with what you say
about a former employee, even if you believe what you are saying is true.
In this case, Ms. Downing resigned from her job as an assistant to Mr.
Burns, a real estate broker.33 After she resigned, Burns's attorney sent
her a demand letter accusing her of copying documents containing
Burns's confidential and proprietary information. 34 Ms. Downing admit-
ted she had copied four pages from the company's policies and proce-
dures manual, but otherwise denied the accusations. Ms. Downing went
on to find another job, but Burns and his wife began telling people that
Downing had stolen their manual and threatened to sue any company
that hired her. Later they added that she had stolen checks from the
Burns brokerage. 35 Threatened by the risk of being sued by Burns,
Downing's new employer fired her from her job.3 6 Downing sued Mr.
and Mrs. Burns for tortious interference and slander.3 7 Mr. and Mrs.
Burns asserted affirmative defenses of justification and qualified privilege
and counterclaimed against Ms. Downing for misappropriation of trade
secrets.
3 8
At trial, the jury found in favor of Downing, and the Houston Court of
Appeals agreed.3 9 The appellate court reasoned that the pages copied
from the policies and procedures manual did not contain any of the Burns
company's trade secrets because the employer did not take measures to
31. Id.
32. Downing v. Burns, 348 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no
pet.).
33. Id. at 418.
34. Id. at 419.
35. Id. at 420.
36. Id. at 419.





maintain the secrecy of the manual.4 0 The employer never communi-
cated that the manual was confidential; it was not marked "confidential,"
and Downing was never asked to sign any confidentiality agreement. 41
Perhaps the most important factor was that apart from some passwords
contained in the manual, the information contained in the manual was
generally known in the industry. 42 The court held that Mr. and Mrs.
Burns slandered Downing and tortiously interfered with her subsequent
employment, even though there may have been truth to their claim that
she took documents from the company, for there was no basis for Mr. and
Mrs. Burns's claim that she had stolen checks and that accusation of theft
was defamatory per se.43
B. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER. IT IS ALSO A NECESSARY ELEMENT
Tortious interference is an intentional tort, meaning that the defendant
must know of an existing contract before it can be held liable for interfer-
ing with it. Hino Electric Holding Co., L.P. v. Constellation Newengery,
Inc. 44 reminds us that a court can direct a verdict in favor of defendants in
a tortious interference claim when it finds no evidence that the defend-
ants had "knowledge" of a current contract.
In Hino Electric, the City of Harlingen had a Master Agreement with
Hino to supply energy and agreed to extend it.45 The extension, called
the "Blend and Extend" contract, reduced the prices for the remaining
months of the Master Agreement term and locked in that rate for 2007.
Energy prices dropped in general, however, and the City asked Hino to
renegotiate the Blend and Extend contract, saying otherwise it would opt
out of the contract altogether. The City also asked a procurement con-
sultant to obtain bids for the next year's energy contract (the same term
as the Blend and Extend contract).46 After the City voted to opt out of
the Blend and Extend contract, it entered into a new contract with a dif-
ferent energy supplier for 2007, let its 2006 Master Agreement contract
run out, and paid for energy under that contract's price rather than the
more favorable rates of the Blend and Extend contract. 47
Hino, insisting that the City could not opt out of its Blend and Extend
contract, brought a tortious interference claim against the suppliers who
had responded to bid requests for the 2007 term. 48 The court directed
verdict for these suppliers, however, because there was no evidence that
they had the intent and knowledge to interfere with Hino's contract.
40. Id. at 422-23.
41. Id. at 423.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 424-26.
44. Hino Electric Holding Co., L.P. v. Constellation Newenergy, Inc., No. 13-09-
00657-CV, 2011 WL 1935616, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May 19, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op.).
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id.




In upholding the directed verdicts, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
pointed out that it is the custom for government contracts to provide pric-
ing to a customer while that customer is still under a current contract
because the understanding is that the customer is requesting pricing for a
term after their current contract expires. 49 Hino failed to prove a tortious
interference claim because it did not show that either supplier had inten-
tionally interfered with its contract with the City.
This situation also illustrates the difficulty of proving knowledge and
intent, especially where a prospective customer is asking different ven-
dors for competitive pricing before its current supply contract has
expired.
C. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A STATUTORY RIGHT?
Tortious interference with contract is well understood in Texas, as is
tortious interference with prospective contracts, or "favorable business
relationships." There is now some suggestion that tortious interference
with a statutory right may be redressable as well. This is not certain, how-
ever, and if Texas recognizes an interference with a statutory right claim,
relief is at least conditioned on proving the defendant intended to
interfere.
In Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., the Northern District
of Texas dismissed the plaintiff's tortious interference with a statutory
right claim against a loan servicer who had declined to discharge the
plaintiff's student loans.50 Johnson claimed his student loans should have
been discharged since the loans were obtained through his university's
false certification of his application. Under 20 U.S.C. § 1087 it provides
that the Secretary will reimburse the holder of a loan and discharge a
borrower's loan where a school has falsely certified a borrower's eligibil-
ity to receive the loan.51 Johnson claimed that the loan servicer had tor-
tiously interfered with his statutory right to have his loan discharged by
sending him a letter that stated he was obligated to continue payment on
his loan, without recognizing that he might be eligible for a loan dis-
charge.52 In effect, Johnson alleged tortious interference, not with a con-
tract, a prospective contract, or favorable business relationship, but with
his statutory right to discharge a falsely certified loan.
While the court did not directly recognize that a cause of action for
tortious interference with a statutory right is available in Texas, it seemed,
at least, to open the door to this cause of action by entertaining the claim
and then dismissing it for failing to plead facts sufficient to support the
intent element.5 3 The court was given the opportunity to state clearly
49. Id. at *4-6.
50. Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-2333-B, 2011 WL
4011429, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1087(c)(1) (2012); see also 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e) (2012).
52. Johnson, 2011 WL 4011429, at *1.
53. Id. at *3-4.
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that such a tort is unavailable in Texas, but declined to say so, instead
dismissing the claim for failing to meet pleading requirements.5 4
IV. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
A. PILING Up DEFENDANTS TO PILE Up DAMAGES
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), a federal criminal act
with a private remedy available in some circumstances, is increasingly be-
ing used by private plaintiffs to redress losses caused by fraudulent acts
using computers. S5 The civil remedy requires a jurisdictional threshold
minimum of $5,000 in loss. Suppose that more than one defendant is in-
volved and no one defendant can be shown to have caused $5,000 in loss,
but, when added together, the losses caused by the defendants do total
$5,000 in loss. May the losses caused by all the defendants be "added
together" to clear the jurisdictional threshold?
In his September 2011 blog post, Shawn Tuma highlights M-I LLC v.
Argus Green LLC56 where two different federal courts answered this
question in the affirmative: a plaintiff may combine, in a single action, the
damages each defendant caused, in order to meet the $5,000 threshold
under the CFAA.57 Accordingly, a plaintiff need not sustain $5,000
worth of loss per each individual defendant.
In M-I, plaintiff M-I, LLC (M-I) brought suit against two former em-
ployees, their new business associate, and the limited liability com-
pany that the three of them had established.58 M-I alleged claims for
breach of contract, fraud, computer fraud, interference with prospec-
tive business relations, and conversion. 59 The defendants sought a
dismissal before both the Eastern District of Texas and the Southern
District of Texas, claiming that no one defendant could be shown to
have caused $5,000 or more in losses; thus, the suit should be dis-
missed for failing to meet the jurisdictional threshold under the
CFAA.60 According to the defendants, federal jurisdiction over the
claim hinged on the plaintiff sustaining a loss of at least $5,000 per
each defendant. Both courts disagreed and concluded that the plain-
tiff was allowed to aggregate the total damages caused by all of the
defendants to meet the $5,000 threshold. Both courts denied the de-
fendants' motion. 61
54. Id. at *5.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
56. M-I LLC v. Argus Green LLC, No. H-10-cv-03364, 2011 WL 3813286 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2011).
57. Shawn Tuma, Is a $5k Loss Required for Each Defendant Under Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act?, COMPUTER DATA PRIVAcY LAW BLOG (Sept. 5, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://
shawnetuma.com/2011/09/05/is-a-5k-loss-required-for-each-defendant-under-computer-
fraud-and-abuse-act/.
58. M-1, 2011 WL 3613286, at *1-2.
59. Id. at *2.




B. INTENTIONALLY CAUSING DAMAGE
Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott "present[ed] an unusual twist to is-
sues that arise all too often when an employee leaves to work for a com-
petitor. '62 Former employees are often accused of having copied data
from their former employer's computer system and taken it with them
when they leave. In this case, however, Mr. Westacott was accused of
having violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), among
other things, by deleting proprietary data from the hard drive of his com-
puter workstation, destroying the only source of a reservoir analysis he
had been paid $125,000 to create. Mr. Westacott admitted deleting some
files, but insisted they were only his personal files. He vigorously denied
destroying anything proprietary, particularly the "only source" of any-
thing. In particular, he denied deleting anything with the intent to harm
his former employer. 63
Devon claimed Westacott had violated section (a)(5)(A) of the CFAA,
which provides that anyone who "knowingly causes the transmission of a
program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct,
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected com-
puter" is guilty of a crime. 64 Section 1030(g) allows a private right of
action by "[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a viola-
tion" of the CFAA under certain circumstances, including when the act
causes "loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period ... aggregat-
ing at least $5,000 in value."'65 But Mr. Westacott claimed not to have had
any intent to cause damage. Could he nevertheless be liable?
The court noted that the Fifth Circuit "has not interpreted" the rele-
vant section, but other district courts have.66 In particular, it noted that
other "[c]ourts have held that the CFAA must be construed narrowly,
even in civil actions, because the same sections that give rise to civil rem-
edies also give rise to criminal penalties. ' 67 Here, then, the court drew a
clear distinction between the "intent" that was involved in hitting
whatever keystrokes Mr. Westacott did and what "intent," if any, he may
have had to cause damage. The court followed the example of another
district court, which had held in a similar context that "[u]ndoubtedly any
copying of plaintiffs' files was deliberate; it is not clear, however, whether
in copying the files, the defendant intended to cause damage. '68 Because
ample evidence existed to create a genuine issue of material fact on this
point, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on
62. Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott, No. H-09-1689, 2011 WL 1157334, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. March 24, 2011).
63. Id.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) & (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
66. Devon Energy, 2011 WL 1157334, at *10.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Oracle Corp. v. SAP AG, 734 F. Supp. 2d 956, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2010))
(internal brackets and quotations omitted).
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whether Mr. Westacott had had the requisite intent.69
V. COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION
A. YES, COMMON LAW UNFAIR COMPETITION IS STILL
A DERIVATIVE TORT
Recovery under the Texas common law tort of unfair competition re-
quires proof of an independent tort. In Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Communica-
tions Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified its
position in a "hacking" case where the plaintiff alleged the common law
tort but failed to identify the "independent tort that interfered with
Snapt's ability to conduct its business."'70
Snapt asserted that United States Sporting Products, Inc. v. Johnny
Stewart Game Calls, Inc.71 altered the court's opinion in Taylor Publish-
ing Co. v. Jostens, Inc.,72 which held that recovery for a Texas common
law unfair competition claim required an independent tort.73 The Fifth
Circuit, however, was quick to point out that, not only did Johnny Stewart
Game Calls predate the opinion in Taylor Publishing, but Taylor Publish-
ing actually cited Johnny Stewart Game Calls.74 Nothing had changed
after all.
VI. FALSE ADVERTISING
A. PATENT "FALSE MARKING": PART I
Remedies for patent infringement are stringent, and, hence, they pro-
vide powerful protection against copying. It follows that patent owners
will not hesitate in putting the world on notice that their products are
protected by patent-in fact, they must provide such notice in order to
take full advantage of those remedies. It follows too, however, that there
will be those who take unfair competitive advantage of the patent scheme
by claiming patent protection where none exists.
The Patent Act has long proscribed "false marking" of products for the
purpose of deceiving the public with claims of protection under patents
which are expired, invalid, or inapplicable. Until recently, any private
party could bring suit for breach of the Patent Act's "false marking" pro-
visions under a qui tam process, sharing $500 per falsely-marked product
with the federal government. 75 But, in 2009 when the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit determined that the $500 provision would
apply per item falsely marked, as opposed to per model or grade or type
of product falsely marked, it became quickly evident that multiplying
69. Id. at *11.
70. Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Commc'ns Inc., 430 Fed. Appx. 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2011).
71. U.S. Sporting Prods., Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214(Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
72. Taylor Publ'g Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2000).
73. Snapt, 430 Fed. Appx. at 350-51.
74. Id. at 351.
75. 35 U.S.C. §,292 (2012).
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$500 by item sales could lead to gigantic recoveries-especially in situa-
tions where a manufacturer had simply neglected to take its patent num-
bers off a product or its packaging (which would often require new
molding) once the patent expired. The predictable result was a minor
gold rush of suits, often brought by persons with no particular competi-
tive interest in the result. 76
The rush came to an abrupt halt, however, with the passage of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011. 77 Among its many changes to
the Patent Act was a drastic revision of the "false marking" provisions.
Now only the federal government has standing to sue for the civil penalty
authorized in Section 292 of the Patent Act.78 A private right of action
still exists for false marking-the anticompetitive potential of false mark-
ing is no less real than it was before the minor "gold rush" began-but
has been sharply cut back; private parties must plead and prove actual
competitive injury resulting from the false marking and can only recover
compensatory damages.79 In particular, it is no longer a violation to leave
a patent number on a product after the patent has expired, provided that
patent did once cover the product.
B. PATENT "FALSE MARKING": PART II
Lost in the furor over "false marking," a qui tam suit is something that
no competitor-or consumer for that matter-wants to face in patent liti-
gation if it can be avoided. It remains true that falsely claiming one's own
product to be "patented" and warning competitors that producing a simi-
lar product-or warning consumers that buying a competitor's similar
product-could lead to patent trouble can be an unfair, but highly effec-
tive, way of directing sales traffic.
This (and more) was alleged in VendEver LLC v. Intermatic Manufac-
turing Ltd..80 VendEver and Intermatic both sell cotton candy vending
machines. VendEver alleged that Intermatic falsely advertised its vend-
ing machines as being "patented" when its machines only had pending
patent applications in the United States and Europe and no patent any-
where until August 2010, when a patent was issued in New Zealand. 81
VendEver further claimed Intermatic had printed language on its ma-
chines suggesting that it had U.S. and European patents on its machine,
had "repeatedly claimed to consumers that Intermatic sells the 'first and
only patented cotton candy vending machine,"' and had warned consum-
ers that "they might have a problem if they purchase[d] VendEver's ma-
chine." VendEver claimed that these misrepresentations caused
76. See, e.g., Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
77. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
78. Id. at § 16(b)(1).
79. Id. at § 16(b)(2).
80. VendEver LLC v. Intermatic Mfg. Ltd., No. 3:11-CV-201-B, 2011 WL 4346324




VendEver to lose potential sales.82
Quite apart from considerations under the Patent Act's qui tam provi-
sions for false marking, the court had no trouble concluding that these
allegations stated a claim which could be redressed under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.83 The court rejected Intermatic's claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) that the numbers printed on the machines were actually
true and not misleading because they contained the serial numbers of the
pending patent applications as opposed to actual patent numbers. The
court, thus, declined to apply to this Section 43(a) claim of false advertis-
ing the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)-which
would have required VendEver to allege who made the statements, when,
and which consumers were affected. 84
C. COMMON LAW FALSE ADVERTISING?
Of particular interest to the court was the fact that, in addition to its
Lanham Act claim, VendEver included a count for "common law false
advertising" under Texas common law.85 The court noted that it is un-
clear whether there is in fact a common law cause of action for false ad-
vertising under Texas law.86 The court reasoned that, in any event, as the
movant seeking to dismiss VendEver's motion, it was Intermatic's burden
to establish that no such cause of action is recognized in Texas or, at least,
that VendEver had not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under it.87
Consequently, the court denied Intermatic's motion to dismiss.88
The court's point was well taken because there really is no such cause
of action as "common law false advertising" in Texas or in many other
states. Generally, except in matters of personal defamation, commercial
disparagement, palming off, and similar situations, there has been a his-
toric reluctance by courts to recognize a general, common law tort of
false advertising, perhaps because of evident difficulties in determining
who would have received the sale instead of the defendant. 89 There have
been exceptions to this reluctance, such as situations in which there are
82. Jd. at *1.
83. Id. at *4. "Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant published '(1) [a] false or misleading statement of fact about a product; (2)
[sluch statement either deceived, or had the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of
potential consumers; (3) [t]he deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the
consumer's purchasing decision; (4) [t]he product is in interstate commerce; and (5) [t]he
plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of the statement at issue."' Id. (citing






89. See, e.g., Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1900)
("It is doubtless morally wrong and improper to impose upon the public by the sale of
spurious goods, but this does not give rise to a private right of action unless the property
rights of the plaintiff are thereby invaded. There are many wrongs which can only be
righted through public prosecution, and for which the legislature, and not the courts, must
provide a remedy."). Id.
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only two sources of a product90 or where a seller falsely advertises his
goods as coming from a region generally known for its quality goods; 91
however, such exceptions are rare. Instead, Texas cases which might oth-
erwise be brought under a "common law false advertising" theory are
typically brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec-
tion Act either by the Attorney General or by consumers, or under Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act where interstate commerce is involved.92
VII. TRADE DRESS
A. TRADE DRESS AND UTILITY PATENT PROTECTION
AT THE SAME TIME
Can a jewelry designer seek trade dress protection on a bottlecap neck-
lace, while at the same time applying for utility patent protection on the
same necklace? The Northern District of Texas says yes.
In M3Girl Designs v. Blue Brownies LLC, the court denied the defen-
dant's summary judgment motion.93 The defendant had sought dismissal
of M3Girl's trade dress claim, because the same trade dress elements the
plaintiff claimed to protect were also the subject of the plaintiff's pending
utility patent application.94 The court noted, however, that, while the ele-
ments may be the same, M3Girl was seeking protection of the overall
design of the necklace.95
Distinguishing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., in
which the U.S. Supreme Court had held that a functional design cannot
serve as a trademark and that a patented design is presumed to be func-
tional, 96 the district court noted that, while the design of the necklaces
may also be functional, the necklace may receive trade dress protection
where the protected elements are not "essential to the use or purpose" of
the jewelry.97 Here, the court held that "the decorated bottlecaps are not
the reason [the product] works." 98 The court refused to find that a pend-
ing utility patent application establishes that the design is functional as a
matter of law and denied the motion for summary judgment.
90. See Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245 (7th
Cir. 1942); Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132, 133-34 (1927).
91. See generally Grand Rapids Furniture, 127 F.2d at 245; Pillsbury-Washburn Flour
Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608 (7th Cir. 1898).
92. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-63 (West 2011).
93. M3GirI Designs v. Blue Brownies LLC, No. 3:09-cv-2390-F, 2009 WL 6354925
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2011) (order denying defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
on plaintiff's trade dress claims).
94. Id. at *2-3.
95. Id. at *5-6.
96. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).





Shell Trademark Management B. V. v. Warren Unilube, Inc. provides an
interesting analysis of the difficult task of defining trade dress infringe-
ment in the context of product packaging. 99 Shell produced a motor oil
product called "ROTELLA," packaged in a white container with two
rounded handles and a color scheme that includes a black cap with blue
and yellow label; Warren decided to offer a lower-cost alternative,
"LUBRIGUARD," in a similar container.100
In order to protect its trade dress, Shell had to show that its packaging
is "nonfunctional" and is either inherently distinctive or has acquired sec-
ondary meaning.101 The parties agreed that the putative trade dress was
"nonfunctional," so the argument first focused on whether it was "inher-
ently distinctive."1 0 2
The court noted that, as the U.S. Supreme Court has held, "a product's
packaging-unlike the design of a product itself-'almost automatically
tell[s] a customer that [it] refer[s] to a brand . . . and immediately ...
signal[s] a brand or a product source." 10 3 "However, 'where it is not
reasonable to assume consumer predisposition to take ... packaging as
indication of source[,] ... inherent distinctiveness will not be found." 0 4
The court held that in determining whether packaging is "inherently dis-
tinctive," the Fifth Circuit applies the factors found in Seabrook Foods,
Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., which include:
[w]hether it was a "common" basic shape or design, whether it was
unique or unusual in a particular field, whether it was a mere refine-
ment of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamenta-
tion for a particular class of goods viewed by the public as a dress or
ornamentation for the goods, [and] whether it was capable of creat-
ing a commercial impression distinct from the accompanying
words.105
Shell moved for summary judgment on the issue of inherent distinctive-
ness, urging that courts have held that product packaging generally is in-
herently distinctive, that the Seabrook factors strongly favor that
conclusion, and that such a conclusion was also supported by consumer
survey evidence. 10 6 The court did note that "product packaging has a
tendency to be inherently distinctive," as noted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Wal-Mart and by the Fifth Circuit in Chevron Chemical Co. v.
99. See Shell Trademark Mgmt. B.V. v. Warren Unilube, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 884
(S.D. Tex. 2011).
100. Id. at 887-88.
101. Id. at 895.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000)
(emphasis, brackets, and ellipses in original)).
104. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213) (brackets and ellipses in original).
105. Id. (quoting Seabrook Foods, 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
106. Id. at 896.
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Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.107 Nevertheless, the defendant sub-
mitted "many pages" of exhibits showing other motor oils with the same
general shape, dual handles, white bodies, black caps, and one or more of
the colors blue, yellow, orange, and white, though not all of those fea-
tures at the same time.10 8 The court concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact must exist and reserved that question for the factfinder. The
court also concluded that material issues of fact must exist as to whether
secondary meaning had been achieved. 10 9
In its own motion for summary judgment, the defendant raised two
interesting questions regarding the issue of no likelihood of confusion: (a)
did Shell prominently display the brand ROTELLA on the label, with the
Shell logo on the bottles, and (b) would that not eliminate any possibility
of confusion caused by the other similarities? 0 After all, argued the
defendant, "'the presence of well-known brands on a trade dress signifi-
cantly reduces, if not altogether eliminates, the likelihood that consumers
will be confused as to the source of the parties' products.""" The court
noted that this was the case, for example, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
McNeill-P.P.C., Inc., in which "'by far the most prominent feature' on the
boxes were the [powerful] trade names 'Excedrin' and 'Tylenol"' and,
thus, the contending "trade dresses ... did not 'create the same general
overall impression.'9"112
That was not the case here, however. When brand names are less
prominent than "Excedrin" or "Tylenol," the court held that a likelihood
of confusion could remain." 3 For example, in Keds Corp. v. Renee Inter-
national Trading Corp., sneaker labels with "words [that could] only be
read" when close to the eyes would not be sufficient "to eliminate the
likelihood of confusion." 4 Further, "even if the names [did] eliminat[e]
[the] risk that consumers would think the two products were the same,
there could still be a risk that they would be led to believe that
LUBRIGUARD was associated with Shell.""15 Particularly when consid-
ering the additional likelihood-of-confusion factors-relative strength of
the Shell trade dress, overlapping sales to the same market, slight evi-
dence of intent to copy, some evidence (though through a flawed survey)
of consumer confusion, and some evidence of relatively little consumer
care in the purchase of motor oil-the court concluded that summary
judgment for the defendant on the likelihood of confusion issue was like-
107. Id. at 897; see Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212; Chevron Chemical, 659 F.2d 695, 702-03
(5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (noting that "the possible varieties of advertising display and
packaging are virtually endless").
108. Id. at 897-98.
109. Id. at 898-99.
110. Id. at 899.
111. Id. (quoting Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal citations omitted)).
112. Id. at 900 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 973 F.2d 1033, 1045 (2d Cir. 1992)).
113. Id.
114. Id.; Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1989).
115. Shell, 765 F.2d at 900.
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wise inappropriate and allowed the case to go to the factfinder. 116
VIII. COMMON LAW FRAUD
A. OPINIONS, PREDICTIONS, AND PROMISES
For purposes of sustaining a fraud claim, a mere opinion is not an ac-
tionable misrepresentation. This was the ruling in Anglo-Dutch Petro-
leum International v. Shore Harbour Capital Management Corp., where
the First District Court of Appeals for Houston reversed the trial court
and dismissed Shore Harbour's fraud claim, holding that it could not
bring a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation based on an opinion.117
Shore Harbour attempted to recover on a theory of fraudulent misrep-
resentation after it invested $100,000 to facilitate the buy-out of an oil
and gas company in Kazakhstan. 118 In return for its investment, Anglo-
Dutch had promised Shore Harbour that it would receive an interest in
the revenues from the Kazakhstan company.'1 9 The deal never closed,
however, and Shore Harbour lost its investment.120 Subsequently, a third
party bought the Kazakhstan company using misappropriated informa-
tion. In a separate action, Anglo-Dutch settled with the third party for
damages from the misappropriation claim, but these damages did not
cover all of Anglo-Dutch's costs. Shore Harbour attempted to recover its
investment from Anglo-Dutch on a fraudulent misrepresentation theory.
The alleged misrepresentation was that "the deal would close."'121
The Houston Court of Appeals found that this was an opinion and not
an actionable misrepresentation of fact. 122 The court did recognize that,
in certain circumstances, an opinion may be elevated to a statement of
fact where the defendant knew of the falsity of the opinion, where a de-
fendant made a promise without intent to fulfill, or where the defendant
had some specialized knowledge of the facts that was not conveyed at the
time the opinion was made.'2 3 None of those circumstances, however,
existed here.
B. PROVING INTENT
How do you prove a defendant intended to defraud? The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals reminds practitioners that intent may be shown by a
variety of factors: "Intent may be inferred from a party's actions before
and after the fraudulent conduct and may also be established by either
116. Id. at 900-01.
117. Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int'l v. Shore Harbour Capital Mgmt. Corp., No. 01-09-00417-
CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1761, at *15 (Tex. App.-Hous. [1st Dist.] Mar. 10, 2011, no
pet.).
118. Id. at *1-6.
119. Id. at *3.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id. at *5-6.
122. Id. at *15.
123. Id. at *9.
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direct or circumstantial evidence."1 24
In Hannon, Inc. v. Scott, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a
finding of fraud where the counter defendant sold the counter plaintiff his
Dollar Land store, but misrepresented the amount of inventory and the
average total sales the store had made. 25 The trial court found that the
counter defendant had defrauded the counter plaintiff and awarded
$60,000 in damages. 126 The appellate court upheld the ruling on fraud,
but suggested a remittitur since the counter plaintiff could not recover for
damages of the quick sale of his home. 127 The court found that "the
means by which [the counter plaintiff] came up with money that he used
for the down payment did not result from [the counter defendant's]
fraud." 128
In reminding practitioners that a defendant's actions before and after
allegedly fraudulent conduct occurs may be considered in proving fraud,
Hannon illustrates how broad the proof may be. Not everything may be
sufficient, however. In particular, it is worth recalling that the mere fail-
ure to perform a promise is not, in itself, sufficient to show that the defen-
dant never intended to perform at the time the promise was made. The
defendant may simply have changed its mind.t2 9
C. Two KINDS OF FRAUD
In Blue Gordon, C.V. v. Quicksilver Jet Sales, Inc., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reminded practitioners that, under Texas
law, there are actually two separate kinds of common law fraud which
remain separate and distinct torts: fraudulent inducement to enter into a
contract and fraud by nondisclosure. 130
The difference lies between an action based on something that has
been said but should not have been and one based on something that has
not been said but (in furtherance of a duty to speak) should have been.
Fraudulent inducement requires the plaintiff to show "'a material misrep-
resentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false
when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was
intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused in-
jury." 131 Fraud by nondisclosure requires a plaintiff to show that:
124. Hannon, Inc. v. Scott, No. 02-10-00012-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3624, at *18
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth May 12, 2011, pet. denied).
125. Id. at *1, 5.
126. Id. at *5.
127. Id. at *30.
128. Id. at *28.
129. See Spoijaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1986) ("A promise
to do an act in the future is actionable fraud when made with the intention, design and
purpose of deceiving, and with no intention of performing the act.").
130. Blue Gordon, C.V. v. Quicksilver Jet Sales, Inc., No. 10-50677, 444 Fed. Appx. 1, at
*10 (5th Cir. June 30, 2011) (unpublished).
131. Id. (quoting Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc.,
960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998)).
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(1) the defendant concealed or failed to disclose a material fact
within his knowledge to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant had a duty to
disclose this fact; (3) the defendant knew that the plaintiff was igno-
rant of the fact and did not have an equal opportunity to discover the
truth; (4) the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to take some
action by concealing or failing to disclose the fact; (5) the plaintiff
relied on the defendant's nondisclosure; and (6) the plaintiff suffered
injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed
fact.132
In this case, the real cause of the plaintiff's injuries was neither a fraud-
ulent inducement nor a fraud by nondisclosure, but rather its own failure
to cure its defaults under a jet lease agreement and pay the amounts
owed. 133 The distinction between these two torts-and between either of
them and their negligence-based, rather than intent-based cousin: the tort
of negligent misrepresentation-is nevertheless instructive.
IX. TRADE SECRETS
A. USING TRADE SECRETS A COMPETITOR ALREADY KNOWS (OR
LEARNS DIRECTLY FROM A CUSTOMER)
Suppose an employee of one company leaves to go work for its major
competitor, carrying with him trade secrets and confidential and proprie-
tary information of his former employer, and begins using it in competi-
tion with his former employer to bid for contracts on behalf of his new
employer. That is one thing. Suppose, however, that his new employer
already knows that confidential information from its own sources and re-
search or, at least, that the former employer cannot show evidence that
the new employer did not receive this information from the customer.
May the former employer recover from the departing employee's new
employer?
In TSBA, Inc. v. Perkins Insurance Agencies, LLP, the Eastland Court
of Appeals said no, at least not without proof that the confidential infor-
mation came from the former employer.134 In upholding summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants, the court found that the plaintiff failed
to raise enough evidence to succeed on its claims-that is, simply showing
that a former employee now works for another company who does busi-
ness with a former customer will not satisfy the evidentiary requirements
to show either misappropriation of trade secrets or tortious interference
with favorable business relations. 135 The dispute arose after Ron Caspell
left TSBA to join Perkins Insurance. 136 Caspell had entered into an em-
ployment contract with TSBA that included certain covenants of confi-
132. Id.
133. Id. at *11.
134. TSBA, Inc. v. Perkins Ins. Agencies, LLP, No. 11-10-00170-CV, 2011 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2363, at *5-7 (Tex. App.-Eastland Mar. 31, 2011, pet denied) (mer. op.).
135. Id.
136. Id. at *3.
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dentiality and a non-compete provision. 137 After Caspell left, TSBA
concluded that Caspell used TSBA's proprietary information about a
TSBA customer when submitting a bid on behalf of his new company for
that customer's business. 138 TSBA soon sued Perkins Insurance and the
individual defendants alleging that they had misappropriated trade
secrets or other confidential information and interfered with an existing
contract and with business relationships, all while acting in a joint venture
and in conspiracy. 139
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the mis-
appropriation claim, however, since TSBA failed to show that Perkins
Insurance and Caspell obtained the customer's confidential information
from TSBA and not merely from the actual customer itself.140 The confi-
dential financial information belonged to the customer, not TSBA.
TSBA failed to prove that Perkins Insurance's source of this information
was TSBA and not the customer, and, therefore, the claim could not
succeed.
The court disposed of the interference with business relations claim
since TSBA failed to provide evidence as to any element of the tort.141
Instead, the court characterized TSBA's assertion as a claim for unjust
enrichment. The court, however, quickly recognized that the defendants
had not actually obtained any money from TSBA and were not liable
under this theory.1 42
Likewise, the court found that TSBA failed to produce evidence to
support its interference with a contract or business relations claims. 14
3
TSBA complained that Caspell provided information about TSBA's cli-
ents to Perkins Insurance in an effort to interfere with TSBA's existing
contracts. 144 The court examined correspondence between the parties
and found no interference. TSBA claimed that Perkins Insurance's re-
quest of a list of clients was evidence that Perkins Insurance was in-
tending to interfere with these contracts. However, the court was quick
to point out that the request for TSBA's client list was framed to avoid a
breach of the noncompetition covenant between Caspell and TSBA, not
facilitate one, and that TSBA had itself invited the complained-of activity
by informing defendants that they should seek out that information from
Caspell. 145
This case highlights one of the thorniest practical problems in business-
tort cases: how to obtain the needed evidence without involving the com-
mon customer(s). No customer wants to be dragged into a dispute be-
137. Id. at *2-3.
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *3-4.
140. Id. at *5-7.
141. Id. at *10-11.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *7-11.
144. Id. at *7-9.
145. Id. at *9.
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tween competing vendors, and if a customer, under subpoena to testify in
a dispute between two vendors, cannot cry "[a] plague [on] both your
houses"1 46 and seek refuge in a third, more peaceful provider, it is at least
likely to remember with distaste the vendor who drug it into the mess and
be open to a change at the next opportunity. If certain information is not
already present in the competitor's files, proving or corroborating that it
did or did not come from a customer is likely to be difficult to do without
the customer's active involvement-or unless relevant email traffic saves
the day.
B. UNIQUE COMBINATIONS?-BUT DISCLOSED IN A
PUBLISHED PATENT APPLICATION
A trade secret "is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the
law to define, 1 47 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
examined it closely in Tewari De-Ox Systems, Inc. v. Mountain States/
Rosen, L.L.C.,148 Here, Tewari claimed to own trade secrets related to a
meat-packing method that would create storage atmosphere practically
free of oxygen. It claimed to have visited Mountain States/Rosen, a
wholesaler of fresh cuts of lamb, and disclosed the secrets pursuant to a
nondisclosure agreement.1 49 When Tewari later accused Mountain
States/Rosen of having misused its secrets, questions arose as to whether
Tewari actually held any protectable trade secrets at all. 150
Quoting a 1964 Texas Supreme Court case, the court noted that "[i]t is
self-evident that the subject matter of a trade secret must be secret."151
Evidently much of what Tewari disclosed to Mountain States/Rosen in
2005 had been covered in Tewari's patent application that was published
the year before. 52 The court noted that "[u]nder Texas law, information
that is generally known or readily available by independent investigation
is not secret for purposes of trade secrecy," and, in a ruling that may be
of some considerable significance, concluded that "[t]here can be no dis-
pute that a published patent application" must certainly be "readily avail-
able" because both Google and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office "allow free online searching of [patents and] published patent
applications."153
The court did not appear to consider that it was making a particular
leap in this regard, as it relied on "the weight of authority" of other juris-
dictions, holding that publication of a patent application would defeat
146. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 3, sc. 1, 1. 87 (Stephen
Greenblatt ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (1623).
147. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978).
148. Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604 (5th Cir.
2011).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 607-08.
151. Id. at 611 (quoting Luccous v. J.C. Kinley Co., 376 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. 1964)).
152. Id. at 611-12.
153. Id. at 612.
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"the secrecy of its contents for trade secret purposes."'1 54 Yet one might
wonder how "readily available" online information (or information in
any library) really is if it would require sophistication, time, effort, or
cleverness to think of looking for it, find it, understand it, and synthesize
it.
Nor did the court accept Tewari's argument that, in Texas, how a mis-
appropriator might have found an alleged trade secret matters less than
how it did find it.15 5 Without rejecting that historic principle of Texas
trade secret law, the court distinguished Tewari's position from the line of
cases relying on that principle, drawing the distinction between cases in
which the defendant learned the plaintiff's trade secrets while they were
still secret (before their secrecy was lost by subsequent patent publica-
tion) and situations, like Tewari's, where the secrecy was lost before the
materials were disclosed to the defendant. 156
Thus, the putative trade secrets published in the 2004 patent applica-
tion were lost. Tewari also claimed five more categories of trade secrets,
however, that were not disclosed in the 2004 application. 157 The district
court concluded that "every specific" of Tewari's trade secrets not already
published in the 2004 application was already known in the industry. 158
Even if that may have been true, however, and even though it is correct
that "a simple and obvious change in an existing device or process is not a
trade secret,"' 159 "'a combination of characteristics and components each
of which by itself, is in the public domain"' can nevertheless, constitute a
protectable secret when its "'unified process, design and operation... in
unique combination, affords a competitive advantage"' and is, of course,
a secret. 160 Here, therefore, Tewari raised a genuine issue of material
fact, and the district court's grant of summary judgment was to that ex-
tent reversed.' 61
There is an important lesson here: intellectual property protections
may sometimes work at cross-purposes to one another and need to be
coordinated.
C. DOES DELETING DATA CONSTITUTE "USE"?
Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott presented another interesting issue,
asking whether deleting a former employer's trade secrets-as opposed to




157. Id. at 612-13.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 613-14 (quoting Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir.
1982) (internal quotations omitted)).
160. Id. at 613 (quoting Imperial Chem., Ltd. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342
F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965) (emphasis added)).
161. Id. at 614.
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lawful "use" of the trade secrets under Texas law.162
Evidently the matter was one of first impression and, perhaps, not an
unreasonable question to ask, for the Court noted that in General Univer-
sal Systems, Inc. v. HAL, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit quoted from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition's
definition of use: "As a general matter, any exploitation of the trade se-
cret that is likely to result in injury to the trade secret owner or enrich-
ment to the defendant is a 'use' under this Section."'1 63 Yet the same
court also noted that "Texas intermediate courts have stated [that] [u]se
of a trade secret means commercial use, by which a person seeks to profit
from the use of the secret."'1 64 The court noted that Devon Energy had
not cited any Texas support for its claim that "use," other than something
intended to yield a profit, could constitute "use" for purposes of a trade
secret claim and found no evidence to indicate that Mr. Westacott had
attempted to profit by deleting the data at issue.' 65 Consequently it de-
nied Devon Energy's motion for summary judgment.
X. CONCLUSION
Perhaps excepting Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, few new principles of fair
or unfair competition emerged this year. Instead, Texas has continued its
common law development in this area, addressing a number of points
including:
(a) stock option grants may now provide sufficient consideration to
support a post-employment noncompetition covenant; 166
(b) whether a cause of action may lie for tortious interference with a
statutory right has been left open;167
(c) plaintiffs may add the losses caused by each defendant, in order to
clear the $5,000 jurisdictional threshold of harm under the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act;1 68
(d) the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act has substantially cut back
private rights of action for "false marking" of patents under Sec-
tion 292 of the Patent Act;1 69
162. Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott, No. H-09-1689, 2011 WL 1157334 (S.D. Tex.
March 24, 2011).
163. Id. at *7 (citing Gen. Universal Sys., 500 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995)).
164. Id. (citing Gen. Universal Sys., 500 F.3d at 450) (quoting Trilogy Software Inc. v.
Calidus Software, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied)) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at *8.
166. See supra Part II (discussing Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex.
2011)).
167. See supra Part III (discussing Johnson v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-
CV-2333-B, 2011 WL 4011429, at *9-10 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2011)).
168. See supra Part IV (discussing M-I LLC v. Argus Green LLC, No. H-10-cv-03364,
2011 WL 3813286, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2011)).




(e) Lanham Act Section 43(a) claims still survive for misrepresenta-
tions of patent status in interstate commerce;170
(f) although a functional design cannot serve as a trademark and a
patented design is presumed to be functional, design features
which are also elements of a patent application may receive trade
dress protection where they are not "essential to the use or pur-
pose of the product;' 71
(g) fraudulent inducement and fraud by nondisclosure are two sepa-
rate and distinct torts;172
(h) trade secrets disclosed in a published patent application lose their
secrecy; 173 and
(i) deleting trade secret information does not constitute "use" of it for
purposes of a misappropriation claim. 174
170. See supra Part VI (discussing VendEver LLC v. Intermatic Manufacturing Ltd.,
No. 3:11-CV-201-B, 2011 WL 4346324 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2011)).
171. See supra Part VII (discussing M3Girl Designs v. Blue Brownies LLC, No. 3:09-cv-
2390-F, 2009 WL 6354925 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2011)) (order denying defendant's motion for
partial summary judgment on plaintiff's trade dress claims).
172. See supra Part VIII (discussing Blue Gordon, C.V. v. Quicksilver Jet Sales, Inc.,
No. 10-50677, 444 Fed. Appx. 1(5th Cir. June 30, 2011) (unpublished)).
173. See supra Part IX (discussing Tewari De-Ox Systems, Inc. v. Mountain States/Ro-
sen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604 (5th Cir. 2011)).
174. See supra Part IX (discussing Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott, No. H-09-1689,
2011 WL 1157334 (S.D. Tex. March 24, 2011)).
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